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​Zensur oder Selbstverteidigung? Zur Sperrung oppositioneller Medien in der Ukraine

​Zensur oder Selbstverteidigung? Zur Sperrung oppositioneller Medien in der Ukraine

On JuWissBlog, Martin Fertmann and Leif Thorian Schmied write about the blocking of three pro-Russian TV channels in Ukraine. The channels were banned without trial by decree, through the collusion of President Selenskyj and the National Security and Defence Council. Based on a Ukrainian sanctions law, the move was justified on the grounds of a threat to national security through the dissemination of Russian propaganda. The authors explain how this decision is to be assessed from a constitutional point of view.

To the article
 

Abstract
The television stations officially belong to a Ukrainian (pro-Russian) member of parliament. However, according to media reports, the actual control over them lies with Viktor Medvechuk. He is one of the best-known pro-Russian politicians in the country and probably a personal friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
 
Under German law, such an amalgamation of politics and media would be questionable under the principle of state neutrality developed by the Federal Constitutional Court. Section 53 (3) of the State Treaty on the Media, for example, stipulates that holding an important position in a legal person under public law (such as a political party) is incompatible with the role of a radio or television broadcaster.
 
In Ukraine, this intermingling is quite common: the most popular Ukrainian media have personal and financial connections to politicians and political parties, as they belong to oligarchs who are either politically active themselves or at least support certain politicians. This also applies to President Selenskyj himself, who initiated the blocking here. The media holding 1+1 of billionaire Igor Kolomoisky was involved in his 2019 election campaign. The decisive factor is whether it can be proven that it is Russian-funded propaganda, which would probably violate Ukrainian sanctions laws.


 
 
Fertmann, M.; Schmied, L. T. (2021): Zensur oder Selbstverteidigung? Zur Sperrung oppositioneller Medien in der Ukraine [Censorship or Self-Defence? On the Blocking of Opposition Media in Ukraine]
, JuWissBlog No. 25/2021, 04 March 2021, https://www.juwiss.de/25-2021/.

​Zensur oder Selbstverteidigung? Zur Sperrung oppositioneller Medien in der Ukraine

On JuWissBlog, Martin Fertmann and Leif Thorian Schmied write about the blocking of three pro-Russian TV channels in Ukraine. The channels were banned without trial by decree, through the collusion of President Selenskyj and the National Security and Defence Council. Based on a Ukrainian sanctions law, the move was justified on the grounds of a threat to national security through the dissemination of Russian propaganda. The authors explain how this decision is to be assessed from a constitutional point of view.

To the article
 

Abstract
The television stations officially belong to a Ukrainian (pro-Russian) member of parliament. However, according to media reports, the actual control over them lies with Viktor Medvechuk. He is one of the best-known pro-Russian politicians in the country and probably a personal friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
 
Under German law, such an amalgamation of politics and media would be questionable under the principle of state neutrality developed by the Federal Constitutional Court. Section 53 (3) of the State Treaty on the Media, for example, stipulates that holding an important position in a legal person under public law (such as a political party) is incompatible with the role of a radio or television broadcaster.
 
In Ukraine, this intermingling is quite common: the most popular Ukrainian media have personal and financial connections to politicians and political parties, as they belong to oligarchs who are either politically active themselves or at least support certain politicians. This also applies to President Selenskyj himself, who initiated the blocking here. The media holding 1+1 of billionaire Igor Kolomoisky was involved in his 2019 election campaign. The decisive factor is whether it can be proven that it is Russian-funded propaganda, which would probably violate Ukrainian sanctions laws.


 
 
Fertmann, M.; Schmied, L. T. (2021): Zensur oder Selbstverteidigung? Zur Sperrung oppositioneller Medien in der Ukraine [Censorship or Self-Defence? On the Blocking of Opposition Media in Ukraine]
, JuWissBlog No. 25/2021, 04 March 2021, https://www.juwiss.de/25-2021/.

About this publication

Authors

Martin Fertmann

Year of publication

2021

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